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Project Gutenberg's Encyclopedia, vol. 1 ( A - Andropha

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It is probable that Aesop did not commit his fables to 
writing; Aristophanes (Wasps, 1259) represents Philocleon as 
having learnt the ``absurdities'' of Aesop from conversation 
at banquets) and Socrates whiles away his time in prison by 
turning some of Aesop's fables ``which he knew'' into verse 
(Plato, Phaedo, 61 b).  Demetrius of Phalerum (345-283 
B.C.) made a collection in ten books, probably in prose 
(Lopson Aisopeion sunagogai) for the use of orators, 
which has been lost.  Next appeared an edition in elegiac 
verse, often cited by Suidas, but the author's name is 
unknown.  Babrius, according to Crusius, a Roman and tutor 
to the son of Alexander Severus, turned the fables into 
choliambics in the earlier part of the 3rd century A.D. 
The most celebrated of the Latin adapters is Phaedrus, a 
freedman of Augustus.  Avianus (of uncertain date, perhaps 
the 4th century) translated 42 of the fables into Latin 
elegiacs.  The collections which we possess under the name 
of Aesop's Fables are late renderings of Babrius's Version 
or Progumnasmata, rhetorical exercises of varying age and 
merit.  Syntipas translated Babrius into Syriac, and Andreopulos 
put the Syriac back again into Greek.  Ignatius Diaconus, in 
the 9th century, made a version of 55 fables in choliambic 
tetrameters.  Stories from Oriental sources were added, and from 
these collections Maximus Planudes made and edited the collection 
which has come down to us under the name of Aesop, and from 
which the popular fables of modern Europe have been derived. 

For further information see the article FABLE; Bentley, 
Dissertation on the Fables of Aesop; Du Meril, Poesies 
inedites du moyen age (1854); J. Jacobs, The Fables 
of Aesop (1889): i.  The history of the Aesopic fable; 
ii.  The Fables of Aesop, as first printed by William Caxton, 
1484, from his French translation; Hervieux, Les Fabulistes 
Latins (1893-1899).  Before any Greek text appeared, a 
Latin translation of 100 Fabulae Aesopicae by an Italian 
scholar named Ranuzio (Renutius) was published at Rome, 
1476.  About 1480 the collection of Planudes was brought out 
at Milan by Buono Accorso (Accursius), together with Ranuzio's 
translation.  This edition, which contained 144 fables, was 
frequently reprinted and additions made from time to time 
from various MSS.--the Heidelberg (Palatine), Florentine, 
Vatican and Augsburg---by Stephanus (1547), Nevelet (1610), 
Hudson (1718), Hauptmann (1741), Furia (1810), Coray (1810), 
Schneider (1812) and others.  A critical edition of all the 
previously known fables, prepared by Carl von Halm from the 
collections of Furia, Coray and Schneider, was published in 
the Teubner series of Greek and Latin texts.  A Fabularum 
Aesopicarum sylloge (233 in number) from a Paris MS., with 
critical notes by Sternbach, appeared in a Cracow University 
publication, Rozprawy akademii umiejetinosci (1894). 

AESOPUS, a Greek historian who wrote a history of 
Alexander the Great, a Latin translation of which, 
by Julius Valerius, was discovered by Mai in 1816. 

AESOPUS, CLODIUS, the most eminent Roman tragedian, 
flourished during the time of Cicero, but the dates of his 
birth and death are not known.  The name seems to show that 
he was a freedman of some member of the Clodian gens.  Cicero 
was on friendly terms with both him and Roscius, the equally 
distinguished comedian, and did not disdain to profit by their 
instruction.  Plutarch (Cicero, 5) mentions it as reported of 
Aesopus, that, while representing Atreus deliberating how he 
should revenge himself on Thyestes, the actor forgot himself 
so far in the heat of action that with his truncheon he struck 
and killed one of the servants crossing the stage.  Aesopus 
made a last appearance in 55 B.C.---when Cicero tells us 
that he was advanced in years--on the occasion of the splendid 
games given by Pompey at the dedication of his theatre.  In 
spite of his somewhat extravagant living, he left an ample 
fortune to his spendthrift son, who did his best to squander 
it as soon as possible.  Horace (Sat. iii. 3. 239) mentions 
his taking a pearl from the ear-drop of Caecilia Metella and 
dissolving it in vinegar, that he might have the satisfaction 
of swallowing eight thousand pounds' worth at a draught. 

Cicero, De Divinatione, i. 37; pro Sestio, 56, 58; 
Quint., Instit. xi. 3, iii; Macrobius, Sat. iii. 14. 

AESTHETICS, a branch of study variously defined as the philosophy 
or science of the beautiful, of taste or of the fine arts. 

Preliminary definition. 

The name is something of an accident.  In its original Greek form 
(aisthetikos) it means what has to do with sense-perception 
as a source of knowledge; and this is still its meaning 
in Kant's philosophy (``Transcendental Aesthetic'').  Its 
limitation to that function of sensuous perception which we 
know as the contemplative enjoyment of beauty is due to A. G. 
Baumgarten.  Although the subject does not readily lend 
itself to precise definition at the outset, we may indicate 
itsscope and aim, as undeibtood by recent writers, by saying 
that it deals successively with one great department of 
human experience, viz. the pleasurable activities of pure 
contemplation.  By pure contemplation is here understood that 
manner of regarding objects of sense-perception, and more 
particularly sights and sounds, which is entirely motived by 
the pleasure of the act itself.  The term ``object'' means 
whatever can be perceived through one of the senses, e.g. 
a flower, a landscape, the flight of a bird, a sequence of 
tones.  The contemplation may be immediate when (as mostly 
happens) the object is present to sense; or it may be mediate, 
when as in reading poetry we dwell on images of objects of 
sense.  Whenever we become interested in an object merely 
as presented for our contemplation our whole state of 
mind may be described as an aesthetic attitude, and our 
experience as an aesthetic experience.  Other expressions 
such as the pleasure of taste, the enjoyment and appreciation 
of beauty (in the larger sense of this term), will serve 
less precisely to mark off this department of experience. 

Differentiation of aesthetic experience.  Its characteristics as feeling. 

Aesthetic experience is differentiated from other kinds 
of experience by a number of characteristics.  We commonly 
speak of it as enjoyment, as an exercise and cultivation of 
feeling.  The appreciation of beauty is pervaded and sustained 
by pleasurable feeling.  In aesthetic enjoyment our capacities 
of feeling attain their fullest and most perfect development.  
Yet, as its dependence on a quiet attitude of contemplation 
might tell us, aesthetic experience is characterized by a 
certain degree of calmness and moderation of feeling.  Even 
when we are moved by a tragedy our feeling is comparatively 
restrained.  A rare exhibition of beauty may thrill the soul 
for a moment, yet in general the enjoyment of it is far removed 
from the excitement of passion.  On the other hand, aesthetic 
pleasure is pure enjoyment.  Even when a disagreeable element 
is present, as in a musical dissonance or in the suffering 
of a tragic hero, it contributes to a higher measure of 
enjoyment.  It is, moreover, free from the painful elements 
of craving, fatigue, conflict, anxiety and disappointment, 
which are apt to accompany other kinds of enjoyment; such as 
the satisfaction of the appetites and other needs.  To this 
purity of aesthetic pleasure must be added its refinement, 
which implies not merely a certain remoteness from the bodily 
needs, but the effect of a union of sense and mind in giving 
amplitude as well as delicacy to our enjoyment of beauty. 

Marked off from practical activity, 

As the region of most pure and refined feeling, aesthetic 
experience is clearly marked off from practical life, 
with its urgent desires and the rest.  In aesthetic 
contemplation desire and will as a whole are almost dormant. 

also from intellectual activity. 

This detachment from the daily life of practical needs 
and aims is brought out in Kant's postulate that aesthetic 
enjoyment must be disinterested (``ohne Interesse''), that 
when we regard an object aesthetically we are not in the 
least concerned with its practical significance and value: one 
cannot, for example, at the same moment aesthetically enjoy 
looking at a painting and desire to be its possessor.  In like 
manner, even if less aoparently, aesthetic contemplation is 
marked off from the arduous mental work which enters into 
the pursuit of knowledge.  In contemplating an aesthetic 
object we are mentally occupied with the concrete, whereas 
all the more serious intellectual work of science involves 
the difficulties of the abstract. The contemplation is, 
moreover, free from those restraints which are imposed 
on our mental activity by the desire to obtain knowledge. 

Uniformity of aestetic experience. 

While as the highest phase of feeling aesthetic experience 
appears to belong to our subjective life, the hidden region of 
the soul, it is connected just as clearly, through the act of 
sense-perception, with the world of objects which is our common 
possession.  Being thus dependent on a contemplation of 
things in this common world it raises the question whether, 
like the perception of these objects, it is a uniform 
experience, the same for others as for myself.  We touch 
here on the last characteristic of aesthetic experience 
which needs to he noted at this stage, its uniformity or 
subjection to law.  It is a common idea that men's judgments 
about matters of taste disagree to so large an extent 
that each individual is left very much to his subjective 
impressions.  With regard to many of the subtler matters of 
aesthetic appreciation, at any rate, there is undoubtedly 
on a first view the appearance of a want of agreement. 

The aesthetic judgment. 

Contrasted with logical judgments or even with ethical 
ones, aesthetic judgments may no doubt look uncertain and 
``subjective.'' The proposition ``this tree is a birch'' seems 
to lend itself much better to critical discussion and to general 
acceptance or rejection than the proposition ``this tree is 
beautiful.'' This circumstance, as Kant shrewdly suggests, 
helps to explain why we have come to employ the word ``taste'' 
in dealing with aesthetic matters; for the pronouncements of 
the sense of taste are recognized as among the most uncertain 
and ``subjective'' of our senseimpressions.  Yet viewed as a 
species of pleasurable feelings, aesthetic experiences will 
be found to exhibit a large amount of uniformity, of objective 
agreement as between different experiences of the same person 
and experiences of different persons.  This general agreement 
appears to be clearly implied in the ordinary form of our 
aesthetic judgments.  To say ``this rose is beautiful'' 
means more than to say ``the sight of this rose affects me 
agreeably.'' It means that the rose has a general power of 
so affecting me (at different times) and others as well. 

Logical judgment and judgment of value. 

The judgment is not the same as a logical one.  It does not say 
simply that as a matter of fact it always does please---even 
if we add the limitation those who for, as we know, our varying 
mood and state of receptivity make a profound difference in 
the fulness of the aesthetic enjoyment.  It is a ``judgment of 
value'' which claims for the rose aesthetic rank as an object 
properly qualified to please contemplative subjects.  This 
value, it is plain, is relative to conscious subjects; yet since 
it is relative to all competent ones, it may be regarded as 
``objective''---that is to say, as belonging to the object.1 
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