foreigners who had suffered from attacks by English ships
made petition for redress to the admiral or the council.
The spoil suit at this time (causa spolii) was a civil
proceeding resulting in a decree absolutoria, dismissing
the defendant, or condemnatoria, ordering restoration
to be made by him. In 1585 the patent of Howard, the lord
high admiral, authorized him to issue letters of reprisal
against Spain; and an order in council regulating the conduct
of those to whom such letters were issued provided by an
additional article (1859) that all prizes were to be brought
in without breaking of bulk for adjudication by the Admiralty
Court. The court was also resorted to at this time by
captors, sailing under commissions granted by the allies of
England, such as the king of France and the Dutch. About
the middle of the 17th century separate sittings of the court
for instance and prize business began, perhaps because of
the conflicting claims to droits of Charles II. and the
duke of York as lord high admiral; and privateering under
royal commission took the place of the former irregular
``spoiling.'' The account which Lord Mansfield gave of the
records of the Admiralty Court, that there were no prize
act books earlier than 1641, or prize sentences earlier than
1648, and that before 1690 the records were in confusion, must
be qualified by the correction that there are in existence
prize sentences (on paper, not parchment) as early as 1589.
Although the courts of common law hardly ever seem to have
interfered with or disputed the admiralty prize jurisdiction,
its exclusive nature was not finally admitted till 1782; but
long previously royal ordinances (1512, 1602) and statutes
(1661, giving an alternative of commissioners, 1670, 1706) had
given the Admiralty Court the only express jurisdiction over
prize. The same statute of Anne and acts of 1739 and 1744 give
prize jurisdiction to any court of admiralty, and the courts
of admiralty for the colonies and plantations in North America.
It has been a disputed question whether the prize jurisdiction
of the court was inherent, i.e. coming within the powers
given by the general patent of the judge, in which no express
mention of it is made, or whether it required a special
commission. Upon this subject the judgment of Lord Mansfield
in Lindo v. Rodney (1782, Dougl. 612), the judgment
of Mr Justice Story in De Lovio v. Boit (1815, 2
Gallison, 398), and Marsden's Select Pleas of the Court
of Admiralty (introduction), may be consulted. But the
settled practice now and for a long time past has been
for a special commission and warrant to be issued for this
purpose. In connexion with this it is observable that in
1793 the Admiralty Court of Ireland claimed to exercise
prize jurisdiction under its general patent; and it is said
to have been the opinion of Sir W. Wynne that the Admiralty
Court of Scotland had a similar right (Brown, Civil Law of
Admiralty, vol. ii. 211, 212). Any jurisdiction of the
Scottish court over prize of war was transferred to the
English court by the Court of Session Act 1825, sec. 57. As
to the Irish court, by the Act of Union it was provided that
there should remain in Ireland an instance court of admiralty
for the determination of causes civil and maritime only.
In 1864 the constitution and procedure of prize courts,
which had until then been prescribed by occasional acts
passed for each war as it arose, were for the first time made
permanent by the Naval Prize Act, by which the High Court
of Admiralty and every admiralty or vice-admiralty court, or
any other court exercising admiralty jurisdiction in British
dominions, if for the time being authorized to exercise prize
jurisdiction, were made prize courts. The High Court of
Admiralty was given jurisdiction throughout British dominions
as a prize court, and, as such, power to enforce any order
of a vice-admiralty prize court and the judicial committee
of the privy council in prize appeals-- this power mutatis
mutandis being also given to vice-admiralty prize courts.
An appeal was given from any prize court to the sovereign in
council. Prize courts were given jurisdiction in cases of
captures made in a land expedition or an expedition made
conjointly with allied forces, and power to give prize salvage
on recaptured ships and prize bounty; and a form of procedure
was prescribed. The High Court was also given exclusive
jurisdiction as a prize court over questions of ransom
and petitions of right in prize cases, and power to punish
masters of ships under convoy disobeying orders or deserting
convoy. By the Naval Discipline Act 1866, power to award
damages to convoyed ships exposed to danger by the fault of
the officer in charge of the convoy was also given to the High
Court. Under other statutes it had power to try questions
of booty of war when referred to it by the crown, in the
same way as prize causes, and claims of king's ships for
salvage on recaptures from pirates, which could be condemned
as droits of admiralty, subject to the owner's right to
receive them on paying one-eighth of the value, and also
power to seize and restore prizes captured by belligerents
in violation of British neutrality, or by a ship equipped in
British ports contrary to British obligations of neutrality.
All jurisdiction of the High Court of Admiralty has since
passed to the High Court of Justice, which is made a prize
court under the Naval Prize Act, with all the powers of the
Admiralty Court in that respect; and all prize causes and
matters within the jurisdiction of that court as a prize
court are assigned to the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division; and an appeal from it as a prize court lies only
to the king in council (Judicature Acts 1873 and 1891).
By an act of 1894 further provision is made for the constitution
of prize courts in British possessions. A commission, warrant
or instruction from the crown or the admiralty may be issued
at any time, even in peace; and upon such issue, subject to
instructions from the crown, the vice-admiral of the possessions
on being satisfied by information from a secretary of state
that war has broken out between Great Britain and a foreign
state, may make proclamation to that effect, and the commission
or warrant comes into effect. The commission or warrant
may authorize a vice-admiralty court or colonial court of
admiralty to act as a prize court, or establish a vice-admiralty
court for that purpose, and may be revoked or altered at any
time. The court is authorized to act as a prize court during
the war, and shall after its conclusion continue to act as
such, and finally dispose of all matters and things arising
during the war, including all penalties and forfeitures incurred
therein. Rules of court may also be made by order in council
for regulating, subject to the Naval Prize Act, the procedure
and practice of prize courts under that act, the duties and
conduct of their officers and practitioners, and the fees
and costs therein (Prize Courts Act 1894, sec. sec. 2, 3). This
latter power has been exercised; and prize rules for the
High Court of Justice and the vice- admiralty prize courts
were framed in 1898 (Statutory Rules and Orders, 1898).
AUTHORITIES.--Marsden, Select Pleas of the Court of
Admiralty, Selden Society, London, 1892 and 1897; Zouch,
Jurisdiction of the Admiralty of England asserted; Robinson,
Collectanea Maritima; Brown, Admiralty; Edwardes, Admiralty;
Phillimore, International Law, vol. i., vol. iii. part xi.;
Pritchard, Admiralty Digest, tit. Jurisdiction. (W. G. F. P.)
UNITED STATES The source of admiralty jurisdiction in
the United States is Article 3, sec. 2 of the United States
Constitution:--``The judicial power shall extend to all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.'' The United
States Supreme Court has declared that by virtue of these
words the admiralty jurisdiction extends not only to the
high seas but to the great lakes and the rivers connecting
them, and to all public navigable waters in the United
States (the ``Genesee Chief'' v. Fitz Hugh, 12 Howards
U.S. Rep. 443), including even interstate canals (Ex.
p. Boyer, 109 U.S. Rep. 629, the ``Robert W. Parsons,''
[1903] 191 U.S. 17), and is not confined to tide waters. The
American colonies had vice-admiralty courts with an admiralty
jurisdiction equal to the largest claimed by the English
admiralty courts even under Edward III. When they became
states they delegated to the federal government their several
``admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,'' using these words
in the sense understood in every country in Europe, England
excepted, and in the sense in which they had then been used
in the colonies for a long time, and without reference to
the very narrow jurisdiction of the English admiralty courts
then existing (Waring v. Clark, 5 Howards U.S. Rep. 441).
It is settled as to the United States admiralty jurisdiction
not that it is ``co-equal with that of the original English,
or that of continental European admiralty, but is rather that
defined by the statutes of Richard II., under the construction
given to them by contemporary or immediately subsequent courts
of admiralty'' (2 Parsons Adm. 176), and that it embraced all
maritime contracts, torts, injuries or offences (De Lovio v.
Boit, 2 Gallisons Rep. 398; Waring v. Clark, 5 Howards
U.S. Rep. 441), and that it has never been restricted by the
action of the common law courts as in England under Lord Coke (2
Parsons Adm. 166 n.; Waring v. Clark; De Lovio v. Bolt.)
Original admiralty jurisdiction was by the Judiciary Act of 1789
(U.S. Rev. Stats. sec. 563) granted to the United States district
courts exclusively, except that concurrent original jurisdiction
was given to United States circuit courts over seizures for
slave trading, and condemnations of property used by persons
in insurrection (sec. 629; sec. 5309), and in the coolie trade
(sec. 2159), and by the act of the 3rd of March 1901; the supreme
court of the District of Columbia is given the same jurisdiction
as the district and circuit courts. The Supreme Court of
the United States has no original jurisdiction in admiralty.
All suits are brought in the first instance in the district
court. Appeals lie, both on the law and on the facts, from
a final decree of that court to the circuit court of appeals
only, except in cases involving the jurisdiction of the court,
the constitutionality of a law of any state or of the United
States, or the validity or construction of any treaty of the
United States, and except cases of prize and capital or infamous
crime, in which cases of appeal lies directly to the supreme
court. In cases of gravity and importance the Supreme Court
may by certiorari review the judgment of the circuit court
of appeals, but such cases are rare (re Lau Ow Bew, 141
U.S. Rep 587; Benedict's The American Admiralty, sec. 607).
Formerly the Judiciary Act authorized an appeal from the
district court to the circuit court, and thence to the Supreme
Court. But the act of the 3rd of March 1891 (Ch. 517)
abolished this and created the circuit court of appeals, making
it the final appellate court in admiralty, except as above
stated. In any case where the district judge is unable to
perform his duties or is disqualified by reason of interest
or of relationship, or has acted as counsel for one of the
parties to the action, it may be removed to the circuit
court in that district (U.S. Rev. Stats. sec. sec. 587, 589 and
601). These are now the only cases in which admiralty suits
