The early jurisdiction of the court appears to have been
exercised very much under the same procedure as that
used by the courts of common law. Juries are mentioned,
sometimes of the county and sometimes of the county and
merchants. But the connexion with foreign parts led to the
gradual introduction of a procedure resembling that coming
into use on the continent and based on the Roman civil
law. The Offences at Sea Act 1536 states the objection to
this application of the civil law to the trial of criminal
cases with much force: ``After the course of the civil laws,
the nature whereof is that before any judgment of death can be
given against the offenders, either they must plainly confess
their offences (which they will never do without torture or
pain), or else their offences be so plainly and directly
proved by witness indifferent such as saw their offences
committed, which cannot be gotten but by chance at few times.''
Restraining Acts.
The material enactments of the restraining statutes were as
follows:--An act of 1389 (13 Ric. II. c. 5) provided that ``the
admirals and their deputies shall not meddle from henceforth
of anything done within the realm, but only of a thing done
upon the sea, as it hath been used in the time of the noble
prince king Edward, grandfather of our lord the king that now
is.'' The act of 1391 (15 Ric. II. c. 3) provided that ``of
all manner of contracts, pleas and quarrels, and other things
rising within the bodies of the counties as well by land as by
water, and also of wreck of the sea, the admiral's court shall
have no manner of cognizance, power, nor jurisdiction; but all
such manner of contracts, pleas and quarrels, and all other
things rising within the bodies of counties, as well by land
as by water, as afore, and also wreck of the sea, shall be
tried, determined, discussed and remedied by the laws of the
land, and not before nor by the admiral, nor his lieutenant in
anywise. Nevertheless, of the death of a man, and of a
maihem done in great ships, being and hovering in the main
stream of great rivers, only beneath the [bridges] of the
same rivers [nigh] to the sea, and in none other places of
the same rivers, the admiral shall have cognizance, and also
to arrest ships in the great flotes for the great voyages
of the king and of the realm; saving always to the king all
manner of forfeitures and profits thereof coming; and he shall
have also jurisdiction upon the said flotes, during the said
voyages only; saving always to the lords, cities, and boroughs,
their liberties and franchises.'' The act of 1400 (2 Hen.
IV. c. 11) adds nothing by way of definition or restriction,
but merely gives additional remedies against encroachments,
providing heavy fines for those who improperly sue in the
court, and those officials of the court who improperly assert
jurisdiction. It was repealed by the Admiralty Court Act
1861. The statutes of Richard, except the enabling part of the
second, were repealed by the Civil Procedure Acts Repeal Act 1879.
The formation of a High Court of Justice rendered them obsolete.
In the reign of James I. the chronic controversies between
the courts of common law and the Admiralty Court as to the
limits of their respective jurisdictions reached an acute
stage. We find the records of it in the second volume of
Marsden's Select Pleas in the Court of Admiralty, and in
Lord Coke's writings: Reports, part xiii. 51; Institutes,
part iv. chap. 22. In this latter passage Lord Coke records
how, notwithstanding an agreement asserted to have been made
in 1575 between the justices of the King's Bench and the
judge of the admiralty, the judges of the common law courts
successfully maintained their right to prohibit suits in
admiralty upon contracts made on shore, or within havens, or
creeks, or tidal rivers, if the waters were within the body
of any county, wheresoever such contracts were broken, for
torts committed within the body of a county, whether on land
or water, and for contracts made in parts beyond the seas.
It is due to the memory of the judges of Lord Coke's time to
say that, at any rate as regards contracts made in partibus
transmarinis, the same rule appears to have been applied at
least as early as 1544, the judges then holding that ``for
actions transitory abroad action may lie at common law.''
Judge's patent.
All the while, however, the patents of the admiralty
judge purported to confer on him a far ampler jurisdiction
than the jealousy of the other courts would concede to
him. The patent of the last judge of the court, Sir Robert
Joseph Phillimore, dated the 23rd of August 1867, styles him
``Lieut. Off. Princ. and Commissary Gen. and Special in
our High Court of Admiralty of Eng. and President and Judge
of the same,'' and gives to him power to take cognizance
of ``all causes, civil and maritime, also all contracts,
complaints, offences or suspected offences, crimes, pleas,
debts, exchanges, accounts, policies of assurance, loading of
ships, and all other matters and contracts which relate to
freight due for the use of ships, transportation, money or
bottomry; also all suits civil and maritime between merchants
or between proprietors of ships and other vessels for matters
in, upon, or by the sea, or public streams, or fresh-water
ports, rivers, nooks and places overflown whatsoever within
the ebbing and flowing of the sea and high-water mark, or
upon any of the shores or banks adjacent from any of the
first bridges towards the sea through England and Ireland
and the dominions thereof, or elsewhere beyond the seas.''
Power is also given to hear appeals from vice-admirals; also
``to arrest . . . according to the civil laws and ancient
customs of our high court . . . all ships, persons, things,
goods, wares and merchandise''; also ``to enquire by the
oaths of honest and lawful men . . . of all . . . things
which . . . ought to be enquired after, and to mulct, arrest,
punish, chastise and reform''; also ``to preserve the public
streams of our admiralty as well for the preservation of our
royal navy, and of the fleets and vessels of our kingdom .
. . as of whatsoever fishes increasing in the rivers''; also
``to reform nets too straight and other unlawful engines and
instruments whatsoever for the catching of fishes''; also to
take cognizance ``of the wreck of the sea . . . and of the
death, drowning and view of dead bodies,'' and the conservation
of the statutes concerning wreck of the sea and the office
of coroner [1276], and concerning pillages [1353], and ``the
cognizance of mayhem'' within the ebb and flow of the tide;
all in as ample manner and form as they were enjoyed by Dr
David Lewis [judge from 1558 to 1584], Sir Julius Caesar,
and the other judges in order (22 in all) before Sir Robert
Phillimore. This form of patent differs in but few respects
from the earlier Latin patents --tempore Henry VIII.--except
that they have a clause non obstantibus statutis.
Modern progress.
As has been said, however, the contention of the common
law judges prevailed, and the Admiralty Court (except for
a temporary revival under Cromwell) sank into comparative
insignificance during the 17th century. The great maritime
wars of the 18th century gave scope to the exercise of its
prize jurisdiction; and its international importance as a
prize court in the latter half of the 18th and the first
part of the 19th centuries is a matter of common historical
knowledge. There were upwards of 1000 prize causes each
year between 1803 and 1811, in some years upwards of 2000.
There were other great judges; but Sir William Scott, afterwards
Lord Stowell, is the most famous. Before his time there were
no reports of admiralty cases, except Hay and Marriott's prize
decisions. But from his time onwards there has been a continuous
stream of admiralty reports, and we begin to find important
cases decided on the instance as well as on the prize side.
In the reign of Queen Victoria, two enabling statutes, 1840 and
1861, were passed and greatly enlarged the jurisdiction of the
court. The manner in which these statutes were administered
by Dr Stephen Lushington and Sir R. J. Phillimore, whose
tenure of office covered the whole period of the queen's reign
till the creation of the High Court of Justice, the valuable
assistance rendered by the nautical assessors from the Trinity
House, the great increase of shipping, especially of steam
shipping, and the number and gravity of cases of collision,
salvage and damage to cargo, restored the activity of the
court and made it one of the most important tribunals of the
country. In 1875, by the operation of the Judicature Acts
of 1873 and 1875, the High Court of Admiralty was with the
other great courts of England formed into the High Court of
Justice. The principal officers of the court in subordination
to the judge were the registrar (an office which always points
to a connexion with canon or civil law), and the marshal, who
acted as the maritime sheriff, having for his baton of office
a silver oar. The assistance of the Trinity Masters, which
has been already mentioned, was provided for in the charter of
incorporation of the Trinity House. These officers and their
assistance have been preserved in the High Court of Justice.
Practitioners in the court.
Till the year 1859 the practitioners in the High Court
of Admiralty were the same as those in the ecclesiastical
courts and distinct from those who practised in the ordinary
courts. Advocates took the place of barristers, and proctors of
solicitors. The place of the attorney-general was taken
by the king's or queen's advocate-general, and that of the
treasury solicitor by the king's or queen's procurator or
proctor. There were also an admiralty advocate and an admiralty
proctor. The king's advocate also represented the crown in
the ecclesiastical courts, and was its standing adviser in
matters of international and foreign law. The king's advocate
led the bar of his courts, and before the privy council took
precedence of the attorney-general. The admiralty advocate
or advocate to his majesty in his office of admiralty
represented specially the lords of the admiralty. In the
Admiralty Court he ranked next after the king's advocate.
In an act of 1859 the practice was thrown open
to barristers and to attorneys and solicitors.
Upon the next vacancy after the courts were thrown open, the
crown altered the precedence and placed the queen's advocate
after the attorney- and solicitor-general. There were two
holders of the office under these conditions, Sir R. J.
Phillimore and Sir Travers Twiss. The office was not filled
up after the resignation of the latter. The admiralty had,
when the courts were thrown open, a standing counsel for the
ordinary courts and a solicitor. Questions soon arose as to
the respective claims of the admiralty advocate and the counsel
to the admiralty, and their acuteness was increased when the
courts were fused into one High Court of Justice. Upon the
resignation of Sir James Parker Deane the office of admiralty
advocate was not filled up. In like manner the proctor to the
admiralty has disappeared. The office of king's or queen's
proctor has been kept alive but amalgamated with that of the
solicitor for the treasury. That officer uses the title of
king's proctor when he appears in certain matrimonial causes.
The last holder of the office of standing counsel to the
admiralty was Alexander Staveley Hill, K.C.,M.P. Since his
death the office, like those of the king's or queen's advocate
and the admiralty advocate, has not been filled up; and the
