one hand as from disbelief on the other; it was the half-way
house between the two, where all questions were ``open.'' All
that Huxley asked for was evidence, either for or against;
but this he believed it impossible to get. Occasionally
he too mis-stated the meaning of the word he had invented,
and described agnosticism as meaning ``that a man shall not
say he knows or believes what he has no scientific ground
for professing to know or believe.'' But as the late Rev.
A. W. Momerie remarked, this would merely be ``a definition
of honesty; in that sense we ought all to be agnostics.''
Agnosticism really rests on the doctrine of the Unknowable,
the assertion that concerning certain objects--among them
the Deity--we never can have any ``scientific'' ground for
belief. This way of solving, or passing over, the ultimate
problems of thought has had many followers in cultured circles
imbued with the new physical science of the day, and with
disgust for the dogmatic creeds of contemporary orthodoxy; and
its outspoken and even aggressive vindication by physicists
of the eminence of Huxley had a potent influence upon the
attitude taken towards metaphysics, and upon the form which
subsequent Christian apologetics adopted. As a nickname
the term ``agnostic'' was soon misused to cover any and
every variation of scepticism, and just as popular preachers
confused it with atheism (q.v.) in their denunciations,
so the callow freethinker--following Tennyson's path of
``honest doubt''--classed himself with the agnostics, even
while he combined an instinctively Christian theism with a
facile rejection of the historical evidences for Christianity.
The term is now less fashionable, though the state of mind
persists. Huxley's agnosticism was a natural consequence of
the intellectual and philosophical conditions of the 'sixties,
when clerical intolerance was trying to excommunicate scientific
discovery because it appeared to clash with the book of
Genesis. But as the theory of evolution was accepted, a new
spirit was gradually introduced into Christian theology, which
has turned the controversies between religion and science
into other channels and removed the temptation to flaunt a
disagreement. A similar effect has been produced by the
philosophical reaction against Herbert Spencer, and by
the perception that the canons of evidence required in
physical science must not be exalted into universal rules of
thought. It does not follow that justification by faith
must be eliminated in spiritual matters where sight cannot
follow, because the physicist's duty and success lie in
pinning belief solely on verification by physical phenomena,
when they alone are in question; and for mankind generally,
though possibly not for an exceptional man like Huxley, an
impotent suspension of judgment on such issues as a future
life or the Being of God is both unsatisfying and demoralizing.
It is impossible here to do more than indicate the path out
of the difficulties raised by Huxley in the letter to Kingsley
quoted above. They involve an elaborate discussion, not
only of Christian evidences, but of the entire subject-matter
alike of Ethics and Metaphysics, of Philosophy as a whole,
and of the philosophies of individual writers who have dealt
in their different ways with the problems of existence and
epistemology. It is, however, permissible to point out that,
as has been exhaustively argued by Professor J. Ward in his
Gifford lectures for 1896-1898 (Naturalism and Agnosticism,
1899), Huxley's challenge ( ``I know what I mean when I
say I believe in the law of the inverse squares, and I will
not rest my life and my hopes upon weaker convictions'') is
one which a spiritualistic philosophy need not shrink from
accepting at the hands of naturalistic agnosticism. If, as
Huxley admits, even putting it with unnecessary force against
himself,``the immortality of man is not half so wonderful
as the conservation of force or the indestructibility of
matter,'' the question then is, how far a critical analysis
of our belief in the last-named doctrines will leave us in
a position to regard them as the last stage in systematic
thinking. It is the pitfall of physical science, immersed as
its students are apt to be in problems dealing with tangible
facts in the world of experience, that there is a tendency
among them to claim a superior status of objective reality
and finality for the laws to which their data are found to
conform. But these generalizations are not ultimate truths,
when we have to consider the nature of experience itself.
``Because reference to the Deity will not serve for a
physical explanation in physics, or a chemical explanation
in chemistry, it does not therefore follow,'' as Professor
Ward says (op. cit. vol. i. p. 24), ``that the sum total
of scientific knowledge is equally intelligible whether
we accept the theistic hypothesis or not. It is true that
every item of scientific knowledge is concerned with some
definite relation of definite phenomena, and with nothing
else; but, for all that, the systematic organization of
such items may quite well yield further knowledge, which
transcends the special relations of definite phenomena.''
At the opening of the era of modern scientific discovery,
with all its fruitful new generalizations, the still more
highly generalized laws of epistemology and of the spiritual
constitution of man might well baffle the physicist and lead
his intellect to ``flounder.'' It is fundamentally necessary,
in order to avoid such floundering, that the ``knowledge'' of
things sensible should be kept distinct from the ``knowledge''
of things spiritual; yet in practice they are constantly
confused. When the physicist limits the term ``knowledge',
to the conclusions from physical apprehensions, his refusal
to extend it to conclusions from moral and spiritual
apprehensions is merely the consequence of an illegitimate
definition. He relies on the validity of his perceptions of
physical facts; but the saint and the theologian are no less
entitled to rely on the validity of their moral and spiritual
experiences. In each case the data rest on an ultimate basis,
undemonstrable, indeed to any one who denies them (even if he
be called mad for doing so), except by the continuous process
of working out their own proofs, and showing their consistency
with, or necessity in, the scheme of things terrestrial on
the one hand, or the mind and happiness of man on the other.
The tests in each case differ; and it is as irrelevant for the
theologian to dispute the ``knowledge'' of the physicist, by
arguments from faith and religion, as it is for the physicist
to deny the ``knowledge'' of the theologian from the point
of view of one who ignores the possibility of spiritual
apprehension altogether. On the ground of secular history and
secular evidence both might reasonably meet, as regards the
facts, though not perhaps as to their interpretation; but the
reason why they ultimately differ is to be found simply in
the difference of their mental attitude towards the nature of
``knowledge,'-itself a difference of opinion as to the nature of man.
In addition to the literature cited above, see L. Stephen, An
Agnostic's Apology (1893); R. Flint, Agnosticism (1903); T.
Bailey Saunders, The Quest of Faith, chap. ii. (1899); A. W. Benn,
English Rationalism in the XIXth Century (London, 1906). (H. CH.)
AGNUS DEI, the figure of a lamb bearing a cross, symbolical
of the Saviour as the ``Lamb of God.'' The device is common
in ecclesiastical art, but the name is especially given in
the Church of Rome to a small cake made of the wax of the
Easter candles and impressed with this figure. Since the 9th
century it has been customary for the popes to bless these
cakes, and distribute them on the Sunday after Easter among
the faithful, by whom they are highly prized as having the
power to avert evil. In modern times the distribution has
been limited to persons of distinction, and is made by the
pope on his accession and every seven years thereafter.
Agnus Dei is also the popular name for the anthem beginning
with these words, which is said to have been introduced
into the missal by Pope Sergius I. (687-701). Based upon
John i. 29, the Latin form is Agnus Dei, qui tollis peccata
mundi, miserere nobis. In the celebration of the mass it
is repeated three times before the communion, and it is also
appended to many of the litanies. By the judgment in the
case of ``Read and others v. The Bishop of Lincoln'' it was
decided in 1890 that the singing of the Agnus Dei in English
by the choir during the administration of the Holy Communion,
provided that the reception of the elements be not delayed
till its conclusion, is not illegal in the Church of England.
For the various ceremonies in the blessing of the Agnus
Dei see A. Vacant, Dict. de theologie (cols. 605-613).
AGOBARD (c. 779-840), Carolingian prelate and reformer,
became coadjutor to Leidrad, archbishop of Lyons, in 813, and
on the death of the latter succeeded him in the see (816). We
know nothing of his early life nor of his descent. He pursued
the same vigorous policy as his predecessor, who had been one
of Charlemagne's most active agents in the reformation of the
Church. He was strongly opposed to the schemes of the
empress Judith for a redivision of the empire in favour of
her son Charles the Bald, Which he regarded as the cause of
all the subsequent evils, and supported Lothair and Pippin
against their father the emperor Louis I. Deposed in 835 by
the council of Thionville, he made his peace with the emperor
and was reinstated in 837. Agobard occupies an important
place in the Carolingian renaissance. He wrote extensively
not only theological works but also political pamphlets and
dissertations directed against popular superstitions. These
last works are unique in the literature of the time. He
denounced the trial by ordeal of fire and water, the belief
in witchcraft, and the ascription of tempests to magic,
maintained the Carolingian opposition to image-worship, but
carried his logic farther and opposed the adoration of the
saints. The basis for this crusade was theological, not
scientific; but it reveals a clear intellect and independent
judgment In his purely theological works Agobard was strictly
orthodox, except that he denied the verbal inspiration of the
Scriptures. Agobard was reverenced as a saint in Lyons,
and although his canonization is disputed his life is
given by the Bollandists, Acta Sanctorum, Jun. ii. 748.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.--Agobard's works were lost until 1605, when a
manuscript was discovered in Lyons and published by Papirius
Masson, again by Baluze in 1666. For later editions see Potthast,
Bibliotheca Historica Medii Aevi. The life of Agobard in
Ebert's Geschichte der Litteratur des Mittelalters (1880), Band
ii., is still one the best to consult. For further indications
see A. Molinier, Sources de l'histoire de France, i. p. 235.
AGONALIA, in ancient Rome, festivals celebrated on the
9th of January, 17th of March, 21st of May, and 11th of
December in each year in honour of various divinities (Ovid,
Fasti, i. 319-332). The word is derived either from
agonia, ``a victim,'' or from agonium, ``a festival.''
AGONIC LINES (from Gr. a-, privative, and gonia, an
angle), the term given to the imaginary lines on the earth's
surface connecting points at which the magnetic needle points to
the geographical north and south. (See MAGNETISM, TERRESTRIAL.)
AGONOTHETES, in ancient Greece, the president or superintendent
